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Abstract
One of the goals of this paper is to demonstrate that denotational semantics is useful
for operational issues like implementation of functional languages by abstract machines.
This is exemplied in a tutorial way by studying the case of extensional untyped call-by-
name -calculus with Felleisen’s control operator C. We derive the transition rules for an
abstract machine from a continuation semantics which appears as a generalization of the
::-translation known from logic. The resulting abstract machine appears as an extension of
Krivine’s machine implementing head reduction. Though the result, namely Krivine’s machine,
is well known our method of deriving it from continuation semantics is new and applicable to
other languages (as e.g. call-by-value variants). Further new results are that Scott’s D1-models
are all instances of continuation models. Moreover, we extend our continuation semantics to
Parigot’s -calculus from which we derive an extension of Krivine’s machine for -calculus.
The relation between continuation semantics and the abstract machines is made precise by
proving computational adequacy results employing an elegant method introduced by Pitts.
Capsule Review
In this paper the authors employ a \proof-relevant" version of a double negation translation
(due to Krivine and Girard) giving rise to a so-called \category of negative domains" NR
which is the full subcategory of the category of predomains on objects of the form RX for
some predomain X where R is a domain (i.e. a predomain with ?) chosen in advance. The
idea behind this is that a \classical proposition" is simply an intuitionistic negation of an
intuitionistic proposition.
The categoryNR is a well-pointed cartesian closed category with least xpoints. Moreover,
it allows to interpret \control features" as Felleisen’s control operator C and Parigot’s -
calculus (which can be seen as calculi whose terms represent proofs of classical (propositional)
logic). Moreover, inNR one may nd models of the untyped -calculus with control, namely
the negative domain RC where C is the solution of the domain equation C = RC  C . It is
observed in the paper that D. Scott’s D1-models of untyped -calculus are subsumed amongst
these by putting D = R.
The main point made in this paper is that, when unfolding the interpretation of untyped -
calculus in RC , the ensuing semantic equations correspond to the transition rules of Krivine’s
machine for computing weak head normal forms of -terms. This extends to -calculi with
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control. This observation is made precise by extending denotational semantics to the abstract
machines and proving correctness and computational adequacy (for the case where R is the
two element lattice).
The paper gives a reconstruction of well-known operational results (Krivine’s machine)
based on continuation semantics where continuations constitute the denotational analogue
of evaluation contexts. But, moreover, these results are extended to Parigot’s -calculus
providing a machine for it that appears to be new in the literature (but has been found
independently by Ph. deGroote by purely proof-theoretic methods).
1 Introduction and motivation
Continuation-passing-style (cps) translations of call-by-value -calculus were intro-
duced originally by Fischer (1972) and Reynolds (1972) in the early 1970s. From its
very beginning continuations were thought of as analogues of the operational notion
of evaluation context. An early study of the cps-translation for -calculi can be found
in Plotkin (1975). In loc.cit. Plotkin had already introduced a call-by-name variant
of the cps-translation which was later taken up again by, for example, Okasaki
et al. (1994), where this call-by-name cps-translation has been reformulated on a
semantical level as an appropriate continuation semantics. A semantic version of
the call-by-value cps-translation has been studied as a special instance of Moggi’s
computational monads, the so-called continuation monad (Moggi, 1991).
The relation between cps-translation and abstract machines for call-by-value -
calculus with control was studied by Felleisen and his colleagues starting from
the mid-1980s (Felleisen, 1986; Felleisen and Friedman, 1986). Over the years, this
method has been developed to an engineering tool for compiler construction (Appel,
1992). Besides this, in a sequence of papers, Felleisen and his collaborators have
studied equational axiomatizations of the cps-translation of call-by-value -calculus
with control (Sabry and Felleisen, 1992).
All the above-mentioned cps-translations and continuation semantics comprise
a notion of value even for the call-by-name variants. Consequently, these cps-
translations and continuation semantics do not validate the -rule. In any case,
Lafont (1991) introduced an elegant ::-translation of classical propositional logic
to the :,^-fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic based on previous work by
Girard and Krivine. It is dierent from Go¨del’s and Kolmogoro’s ::-translations
which correspond to a call-by-name cps-translation with values and a call-by-
value one, respectively. As constructive logic has a proof semantics corresponding
to a (model of a) simple functional language, such a translation of classical to
constructive logic gives rise to a proof semantics for classical logic. It was made
clear by Lafont in loc.cit. that also his ::-translation can be understood as a
cps-translation of call-by-name -calculus with control to a particular fragment of
-calculus corresponding to the :,^-fragment of intuitionistic logic. A semantic
analogue of Lafont’s new cps-translation was studied and extended to PCF with
control (and input/output) by Lafont et al. (1993). The distinguishing feature of
this cps-translation and the corresponding continuation semantics is that it does
not admit a basic notion of value but, instead, a basic notion of continuation.
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Continuation semantics a la Lafont gives rise to a cartesian closed category, the
category of ‘negated domains’.
This category NR appears as the full subcategory of the category of domains
and continuous functions on objects of the form RA where A is a predomain and
R is some xed domain of ‘responses’. This domain R = R1 is the meaning of the
proposition ?. Interpreting -calculus inNR the denotation of a -term is an object
of RC mapping elements of C { so-called ‘continuations’ { to ‘responses’ or ‘answers’,
i.e. elements of R. Accordingly, elements of RC are called ‘denotations’.
Due to the isomorphism (RB)(R
A) = RRAB we get that the predomain of continu-
ations for the exponential (RB)(R
A) is RA  B. This means that a continuation for a
function f from RA to RB is a pair h d; k i where d 2 RA is an argument for f and
k 2 B is a continuation for f(d).
Due to this simple construction of function spaces inNR we get that :RA = RRA
as :RA is dened as RA ) R1 which is RRA1 = RRA . Moreover, the canonical map
from RR
RA
to RA sending  to a:A:(f:RA: f(a)) 2 RA provides an interpretation
of the classical proof principle ::P ) P (reductio ad absurdum). It is (a variant of)
this interpretation of reductio ad absurdum which will be assigned as meaning to the
control operator C originally introduced by Felleisen (1986). The idea to understand
the control operator C as a proof of reductio ad absurdum via the principle of
propositions-as-types was rst introduced by Grin (1990).
To interpret untyped -calculus in NR one has to exhibit a so-called reflexive
object in NR i.e. a C with RC = RRCC . For this purpose, it suces to provide
a domain C with C = RC  C . Reflexive objects in NR of this form will be
called continuation models of untyped -calculus. It turns out that these { up to
isomorphism { coincide with Scott’s D1-models.
The point we try to make in this paper is that the category of negated domains
arises from fairly simple ‘logical’ considerations without any a priori operational
motivation. Furthermore, it turns out that the interpretation of -calculus in the
category of negated domains extends easily to an interpretation of an untyped version
of Parigot’s -calculus1 (cf. Parigot (1992)), where continuations can be referred to
by continuation variables that can be bound by -abstraction. Accordingly, one has
more freedom in expressing control structure than by Felleisen’s control operator C.
Parigot’s ‘labelling’ []M is interpreted as application of the meaning of M {
an element of D = RC { to the continuation bound to  thus giving rise to an
element of R. Parigot’s -abstraction : t is interpreted as functional abstraction
over the continuation variable  on the level of continuation semantics. As objects
of C = D  C can be considered as (lazy) stacks of denotations it is natural
to extend the -calculus by allowing more general continuation terms than mere
continuation variables namely stack expressions of the form M1 :: : : :Mn :: .
Using this semantically motivated extension we obtain a simplication of Parigot’s
equational theory getting rid of his ‘mixed substitution’ and replacing it by ordinary
substitution of continuation terms for continuation variables.
1 Parigot’s -calculus, however, was invented for the purpose of representing proofs in a natural
deduction formulation of classical propositional logic by terms.
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As mentioned before, Felleisen and others have used cps-translation for deriving
abstract machines for the call-by-value -calculus with control. In this paper, we
use continuation semantics a la Lafont for deriving Krivine’s machine. It turns out
that the semantic equations of the interpretation of -calculus in the category of
negated domains are in 1-1-correspondence with the transition rules of Krivine’s
machine, the world’s simplest machine interpreting -calculus. All this extends easily
to -calculus with control and also -calculus.
This way the partial correctness of Krivine’s machine follows easily from the way
it is derived from continuation semantics. The correspondence is given by identifying
expressions of the form [[M]] e k, i.e. the meaning of term M in environment e applied
to continuation k, with the states of Krivine’s machine, i.e. expressions of the form
h [M; env]; S i where env is an environment assigning closures to variables and S is
a stack of closures.
For a moderate extension of Krivine’s machine (computing head normal forms
and not only weak head normal forms) we can prove computational adequacy in a
very semantic way employing the technique of ‘inclusive predicates’. This goes back
to Reynolds and was simplied and extended to untyped languages by Pitts (1994)
using recent methods arising from Freyd’s category-theoretic analysis of recursive
domain equations (Freyd, 1992).
For the case of -calculus a similar machine has been obtained by P. de Groote
via purely syntactic methods in de Groote (1996) which, however, seems to be more
complicated.
A dierent relation between denotational semantics and implementations of func-
tional languages has been investigated by Jerey (1994). There, it has been shown
that the initial/terminal solution of D = [D ! D]? provides a fully abstract model
for concurrent graph reduction for an untyped lazy -calculus with recursive decla-
rations and a parallel convergence tester. The models, presented in this paper, are
not fully abstract for operational semantics as given by our abstract machines. This
could be achieved, however, by extending them in such a way that they implement
a parallel convergence tester as well. In contrast to our work, Jerey starts with
a given operational semantics and proves that the (obvious) Scott model for it is
actually fully abstract, whereas we derive operational semantics from a denotational
semantics, namely a continuation semantics arising from a generalization of the
::{translation of classical to intuitionistic logic.
2 The category NR of negated domains
In this section we describe a category of ‘negated domains’ originally introduced
by Lafont et al. (1993), where terms of -calculi with control will be assigned their
meaning.
Ordinary ‘direct’ semantics lives in the category P of (pre)domains and Scott
continuous functions. In our context, a predomain is simply a partial order having
suprema of all directed subsets but not necessarily a least element. A function
between predomains is Scott continuous i it preserves suprema of directed sets. A
domain is a predomain that has also a least element, called bottom element. The
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corresponding full subcategory of domains will be referred to as D. Notice that a
continuous function between domains need not preserve bottom elements. If it does
it is called strict. We write D? for the category of domains with strict maps as
morphisms.
We present a similarly general framework for continuation semantics: the cate-
gory of negated domains NR which is parameterized by an arbitrary domain R of
responses. We assume R to have a least element in order to guarantee that NR has
a (least) xpoint operator.
Before giving the precise denition ofNR we provide some motivation considering
the semantics of classical proofs.
In the 1930s, Kurt Go¨del showed how classical logic can be translated into
intuitionistic logic by his famous ‘double negation translation’ explained, for example,
in Troelstra and van Dalen (1988). Though this can be done syntactically, we prefer
to explain Go¨del’s double negation translation in terms of truth value semantics.
Let A be a Heyting algebra, i.e. a lattice together with a binary operation !:
A A! A such that for all a; b; c 2 A we have c 6 a! b i c ^ a 6 b. Notice that
the operation ! is determined uniquely already by the lattice structure of A. Now
for all r 2 A (including the least element of lattice A)
Ar = fa! r j a 2 Ag
is a Boolean algebra w.r.t. the partial order inherited from A. The Boolean negation
of a 2 Ar is given by a ! r. Notice that inma and ! are inherited from A
but r is the least element in Ar and the supremum of a and b in Ar is given by
((a! r) ^ (b! r))! r.
The denition of NR is motivated by lifting this simple construction from truth
values semantics, i.e. Heyting algebras, to proof semantics, i.e. cartesian closed cat-
egories with nite coproducts. This way one obtains a proof semantics for classical
logic as will be shown subsequently.
Denition 2.1
The category NR of negated domains is dened as follows. The objects of NR are
the objects of P and NR(A;B) = P(RA; RB), i.e. a morphism in NR from A to B
is a morphism in P from RA to RB . Composition of morphisms in NR is inherited
from P.
Thus, the category NR is equivalent to the full subcategory of P on powers of
R. As R has a least element by assumption any of its powers has a least element,
too. Therefore, NR is equivalent actually to a full subcategory of the category of
domains and all continuous functions.
Next we show that the category NR is still well-behaved in the sense that it has
enough structure to interpret functional programs.
Theorem 2.1
For any domain R the category NR is cartesian closed and admits a least xpoint
operator.
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Proof
As the category of predomains has categorical sums we have the isomorphisms
RA  RB = RA+B . Therefore, NR has cartesian products. The terminal object in
NR is given by the empty predomain 0 as R0 = 1 contains precisely one element. Due
to the isomorphism (RB)(R
A) = RRAB we get that NR is also closed under function
spaces. For any predomain A the predomain RA has a least element ?RA = x:A:?R .
Thus, any f 2 NR(A;A) = P(RA; RA) has the least xpoint ⊔n2N fn(?RA). q
Remark 2.1
Notice that for the existence of cartesian products in NR it is essential to have
predomains instead of only domains because the category of domains and continuous
functions lacks sums in the categorical sense.
Theorem 2.1 suggests notation as xed in the following denition.
Denition 2.2
InNR we write cartesian product as A ^ B := A+B and function space (exponen-
tiation) as A ) B := RA  B.
Next we show how to interpret ‘classical negation’ in NR .
Denition 2.3
We write ? (‘falsity’) for the terminal predomain 1 = f?g considered as an object
on NR . For any A in NR let :A := A ) ? which abbreviates RA  1.
Next we show that this notion of negation actually behaves classically, i.e. for any
A in NR there is a morphism CA : ::A ! A in NR corresponding to reductio ad
absurdum distinguishing classical logic from intuitionistic logic.
Theorem 2.2
For any A in NR let A : A ! ::A and CA : ::A ! A be the morphisms in NR
such that
A(a)hf; ?i = fha; ?i
for all a 2 RA and f 2 R:A and
CA(f)(k) = f h(ha; hi::A: a(k)); ?i
for all f 2 R::A and k 2 A.
Then CA  A = idA.
Proof
For d 2 RA and k 2 A we have
(CA  A)(d)(k) =
= A(d)h(hf; hi::A: f(k)); ?i =
= (hf; hi::A: f(k))hd; ?i =
= d(k) =
= idA(d )(k )
Thus, by extensionality of NR-morphisms we have CA  A = idA. q
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For any domain R the categoryNR provides a ‘proof semantics for classical logic’,
i.e. a -calculus with a distinguished type ? representing the proposition falsity such
that for any type A there is a morphism CA : ::A ! A in NR corresponding to
the classically valid principle of reductio ad absurdum.
Remark 2.2
If we had decided to dene :A as RA then A : A! ::A and CA : ::A! A could
have been dened more easily as the following morphisms in P
A = "RA and CA = R"A
where for any X in P the P-morphism "X : X ! RRX is dened as "X(x)(p) = p(x).
Straightforward computation shows that
R"A  "RA = idRA :
This observation should make transparent the idea behind our ‘ocial’ denition of
 and C which appears as slightly more complicated only because { for reasons of
uniformity { we insist on dening :A as A ) ?.
If we had chosen R to be the empty predomain 0 then the resulting categoryNR
would be rather trivial. As 0A is empty if A is non-empty and 0A contains precisely
one element, otherwise, the category NR were equivalent to the 2-element Boolean
lattice . The case R = 1 leads to the same problem as for any A we have 1 = 1A.
Thus, for obtaining a nontrivial category of negated domains a minimal choice is
R = .
We conclude this section by showing that Theorem 2.2 cannot be improved to the
extent that A  CA = id::A for all A.
The underlying reason for this phenomenon is the following quite general fact
(originally observed by Joyal for the special case where R is initial).
Theorem 2.3
Let C be a cartesian closed category together with a distinguished object R such
that A = RRA for all A in C. Then R is subterminal, i.e. R is a subobject of 1, and
C is a preorder, i.e. all parallel arrows in C are equal. Thus, C is equivalent to a
Boolean lattice.
Proof
If "1 : 1 ! RR1 were an isomorphism then this would give rise to the following
1-1-correspondence
C(A; 1) = C(A;RR1 ) = C(A;RR) = C(A R; R)
for all A in C.
Instantiating A by R itself we get that there exists precisely one map R  R ! R.
Thus, both projections i : R  R ! R are equal and, therefore, for any A there is
at most one map A! R. Thus, R ! 1 is a monomorphism, i.e. R is subterminal.
Now for any objects A and B in C we have that
C(A;B) = C(A;RRB ) = C(A RB; R):
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As there is at most one map A  RB ! R since R is subterminal there also exists
at most one map from A to B. So C is a preorder and, therefore, equivalent to a
Boolean lattice. q
The theorem shows that any model of classical logic where any proposition A is
isomorphic to ::A is already equivalent to a Boolean lattice where all proofs of a
proposition are equal. But, the categories NR introduced above provide models of
classical logic where for any proposition A there are maps A! ::A and ::A! A
establishing the logical equivalence of the propositions A and ::A although they
are not isomorphic. This is in accordance with traditional classical logic which only
postulates the logical equivalence of A and ::A but not that they are isomorphic2.
3 Continuation semantics for -calculi with control features
3.1 The pure -calculus
According to Scott (1980), a model of the extensional -calculus is given by a
reflexive object D in a cartesian closed category where an object D is called reflexive
i D is isomorphic to DD = [D ! D], the type of functions from D to D (in the
sense of the ambient cartesian closed category).
In a category of negated domains NR an object C is reflexive i RC = RRCC
in the category P of predomains. Thus, for obtaining a reflexive object in NR it
suces to nd a solution of the domain equation
C = RC  C
in the category D of domains. It is clearly sucient to look for solutions in D and,
furthermore, in P there do not exist solutions which are simultaneously initial and
terminal (Plotkin, 1983; Freyd, 1992).
The initial/terminal solution of this domain equation gives rise to a continuous
isomorphism
con : (RC  C)! C
(called ‘constructor’) with inverse
dec := con−1 : C ! (RC  C)
(called ‘destructor’) which in turn { by applying the contravariant functor R( ) {
gives rise to the (mutually inverse) pair of continuous isomorphisms
Rdec : RR
CC ! RC and Rcon : RC ! RRCC:
establishing that C = RC C inNR . As RRCC = (RC)RC in D we get a solution to
the domain equation D = DD in D by taking D = RC .
Convention. We assume that con (and dec) are actually identities, i.e. that we have
an initial terminal solution of the domain equation C = RC  C up to equality
2 That propositions are isomorphic cannot even be expressed in traditional logic due to the absence of
proof objects and equalities between them.
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(which can always be achieved by choosing an appropriate isomorphic variant of
the functor ). This assumption will facilitate subsequent computations as con and
dec being identities will allow us to omit them.
Surprisingly, it will turn out that D = RC is isomorphic to the D1-model of the
extensional -calculus as constructed by Dana Scott in 1969 (cf. Barendregt, 1984,
x 18.3) by instantiating the D of D1 by the domain R of responses. Thus all known
non-syntactic models of extensional3 -calculus turn out as being isomorphic to
continuation models, i.e. as solutions to the domain equation D = [D ! D] in NR ,
and, therefore, allow one to interpret control operators like Felleisen’s C as we shall
see in the next section.
Theorem 3.1
Let C be the initial/terminal solution of the equation C = RC  C in D. Then for
D := RC the continuous functions
eval : D ! DD and abst : DD ! D
dened as
eval(d)(d0)(k) = d hd0; ki and abst(f) hd; ki = f(d)(k)
constitute an isomorphism pair.
Furthermore, D is isomorphic to the R1-model, i.e. the D1-model with D = R.
Proof
First we show that abst  eval = idD and eval  abst = idDD :
(abst  eval)(d)hd0; ki =
= abst(eval(d))hd0; ki = eval(d)(d0)(k)
= d hd0; ki
(eval  abst)(f)(d)(k) =
= eval(abst(f))(d)(k) = abst(f)hd; ki =
= f(d)(k) .
Next we will show that D = RC is isomorphic to R1. This will be done by
exhibiting an isomorphism between the !-diagrams of embedding/projection pairs
whose inverse limits are D = RC and R1, respectively.
First, remember that the initial/terminal solution to the recursive domain equa-
tion C = RC  C is constructed as the inverse limit of the sequence of embed-
ding/projection pairs
(in : Cn ! Cn+1 ; qn : Cn+1 ! Cn)n2N
which is dened by primitive recursion as follows
C0 := f?g, Cn+1 := RCn  Cn
i0 : C0 ! C1, q0 : C1 ! C0 are the unique strict maps
in+1 := R
qn  in qn+1 := Rin  qn .
3 Here extensional means that the -rule y: xy = x is valid in the model.
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Next remember that R1 is dened as the inverse limit of the sequence of embed-
ding/projection pairs
(en : Rn ! Rn+1 ; pn : Rn+1 ! Rn)n2N
which is dened by primitive recursion as follows
R0 := R Rn+1 := R
Rn
n
e0 : R0 ! R1 : r 7! x:R: r en+1 := enpn
p0 : R1 ! R0 : f 7! f(?) pn+1 = pnen .
To prove that D = RC and R1 are isomorphic it is sucient to show that the
sequences of embedding/projection pairs
(Rqn ; Rin)n2N and (en; pn)n2N
are isomorphic because then their inverse limits are isomorphic, too. For this purpose
we dene a sequence of isomorphism pairs
(fn : Rn ! RCn ; gn : RCn ! Rn)n2N
such that for all n 2 N
fn+1  en = Rqn  fn
Such a sequence can be dened recursively as follows:
f0 : R0 ! RC0 : r 7! x:C0: r fn+1 := uncurry  fngn
g0 : R
C0 ! R0 : h 7! h(?) gn+1 = gnfn  curry .
The required properties can be proved by straightforward, but tedious induction.
Despite the technicality of the induction proof, intuitively, the key point is that the
conditions above are satised for n = 0. The rest follows from the fact that (RY )R
X
and RR
XY are isomorphic naturally in X and Y . q
For the reflexive object D = RC , where the required isomorphism is given by
eval and abst of the previous Theorem 3.1, we can dene the interpretation of
the extensional untyped -calculus according to the general pattern described by
Scott (1980).
Denition 3.1
The interpretation function [[ ]] : Term ! (Var ! D) ! D is dened by structural
recursion as follows
[[x]] e := e(x)
[[ x:M]] e := abst(d:D:[[M]] e[x := d])
[[MN]] e := eval([[M]] e)([[N]] e) ,
where abst and eval are dened as in Theorem 3.1.
By unfolding the denitions of abst and eval in the previous denition we get
the following more explicit denition of the interpretation function.
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Theorem 3.2
The interpretation function [[ ]] : Term! (Var! D)! D of Denition 3.1 can be
dened equivalently by the following equations
[[x]] e k = e(x)(k)
[[ x:M]] e hd; ki = [[M]] e[x := d] k
[[MN]] e k = [[M]] e h[[N]] e; ki .
Proof
The rst equation is immediate. The remaining two equations can be proved by
unfolding the denitions of abst and eval from Theorem 3.1 and exploiting the fact
that any object of type C is necessarily of the form hd; ki.
[[x:M]] e hd; ki = abst(d : D: [[M]] e[x := d])hd; ki =
= (d:D: [[M]] e[x := d])(d)(k) =
= [[M]] e[x := d] k
[[MN]] e k = eval([[M]] e)([[N]] e)(k) =
= [[M]] e h[[N]] e; ki .
q
The simplest continuation model of the extensional -calculus is 1, i.e. D1 for
D = , where  = f?;>g is the domain containing only two dierent elements,
also known as Sierpinski space. This  corresponds to the space of observations
where one can only observe termination represented by > and non-termination or
divergence represented by ?.
A famous result of Wadsworth (cf. Barendregt, 1984, Theorem 19.2.4) establishes
a useful equivalence between interpretations in the 1-model and operational prop-
erties of -terms: for a closed term M the process of head reduction terminates i
the interpretation of M in 1 is dierent from ?.
Theorem 3.3
Let  = f?;>g and C be the initial/terminal solution of C = C  C in D?.
Let D = C , >D = k:C:> and stop 2 C be the greatest element in C , i.e.
stop = h>D; stopi. Then for arbitrary -terms M the following are equivalent:
(i) M has a head normal form, i.e. the process of head reduction terminates
(ii) [[M]] e> stop = >
where e>(x) = >D for all variables x, i.e. e> is the environment that maps any
variable to the maximal element in D.
Proof
Wadsworth’s Theorem 19.2.4 states that a closed term M is unsolvable, i.e. the
process of head reduction diverges, i the interpretation of M in 1 is ?. From this
and our Theorem 3.1 it follows immediately that a closed term M has a head normal
form i its interpretation in 1 is dierent from ?, i.e. [[M]] e> stop = > (we have
that [[M]] e = [[M]] e> for all environments e as M is closed by assumption).
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We now extend this result to open terms M. Obviously, an open term M has a
head normal form i its ‘-closure’ ~x:M has a head normal form (where~x is the list
of all variables free in M). Thus, from the consideration above it follows that M has
a head normal form i [[~x:M]] e> stop = >. From the second semantic equation of
Theorem 3.2 we get that for an arbitrary term N we have
[[x:N]] e> stop = [[N]] e>[x := >] stop = [[N]] e> stop
as stop = h>; stopi. Thus, by induction on the length of ~x we get that
[[~x:M]] e> stop = [[M]] e> stop
and, therefore, M has a head normal form i [[M]] e> stop = >. q
This result will be crucial for proving a computational adequacy result for an
extension of Krivine’s machine computing head normal forms instead of weak head
normal forms.
3.2 The C-calculus
3.2.1 Continuation semantics
The syntax of the C-calculus is that of the untyped -calculus together with a
new unary operator C, called Felleisen’s Control Operator, which was introduced
originally in (Felleisen and Friedman, 1986) for call-by-value -calculus.
Later we will interpret (the call-by-name version of) C as an untyped analogue of
the operator C introduced in Theorem 2.2 above. The equations governing the use
of C will be derived from its semantics (c.f. Theorem 3.5).
But rst we dene terms and evaluation contexts of C-calculus.
Denition 3.2
The terms and evaluation contexts of the C-calculus are dened as follows :
(Term) M ::= x j x:M j MM j CM
(EvCont) E ::= [] j EM
The fragment without C is known as the ordinary untyped -calculus.
Notice that an evaluation context is always of the form []M1:::Mn, i.e. given by a
list of arguments.
The conversion or rewrite rules of the C-calculus are intentionally not stated
here but will be extracted from a careful examination of the subsequently given
continuation semantics which we consider as more fundamental.
Next we will give an interpretation of Felleisen’s control operator C in D = RC
where C is the initial/terminal solution of C = RC  C in D?.
Recall (Theorem 2.2) that in NR for every object A there is a morphism CA :
((A ) ?) ) ?)! A with
CA(d)(k) = d (h  hd0; hi : A ) ?: d0(k) ; ? i)
for all d : ((A ) ?) ) ?)! R and k 2 A.
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The denition of CA : ((A ) ?) ) ?) ! A can be generalized by replacing ?
by an arbitrary non-empty predomain B. For any b 2 B and all objects A of NR
there is a morphism CbA : ((A ) B) ) B)! A with
CbA(d)(k) = d (h hd0; hi : A ) B: d0(k) ; b i)
for all d : ((A ) B) ) B) ! R and k 2 A. Again, as in Theorem 2.2 by
straightforward computation one can show that CbA  BA = idRA for the morphism
BA : A! (A ) B) ) B in NR with
BA (a)hd; yi = dha; yi
for all d : (A ) B)! R and y 2 B.
Obviously, CbA depends upon b. Moreover, if b1 v b2 then Cb1A v Cb2A . Therefore,
if B happens to have a greatest element > then it is natural4 to choose this for b as
C>A is the greatest element in fCbA j b 2 B g w.r.t. the domain ordering v.
Now having generalized CA to CbA whenever b 2 B we are ready to interpret
Felleisen’s control operator C in a type-free setting, namely as CcC for some c 2 C
where C is the initial/terminal solution of C = RC  C .
If R has a greatest element > then C has a greatest element stop which is
characterized uniquely by the equation
stop = hk:C:>; stopi
and in this case C will be interpreted as CstopC . This convention applies in particular
when R = .
Denition 3.3
Let D = RC where C is the initial/terminal solution of C = RC  C . The inter-
pretation function [[ ]] : Term ! (Var ! D) ! D (where Term denotes the set of
C-terms) is dened by structural recursion as follows :
[[x]] e = e(x)
[[ x:M]] e hd; ki = [[M]] e[x := d] k
[[MN]] e k = [[M]] e h[[N]] e; ki
[[CM]] e k = [[M]] e hret(k); stopi
where ret(k) = hd; hi: d(k) 2 D and stop 2 C .
Convention. If R contains a greatest element > then stop will always be the greatest
object in C characterized uniquely by the equation stop = h>RC ; stopi where >RC =
k:C:>R is the greatest element in RC .
Since C is dened recursively as C = RC C one may consider a continuation, i.e.
a k 2 C , as an innite list of denotations, i.e. elements of D = RC . Such innite lists
of denotations can be interpreted as denotational versions of call-by-name evaluation
contexts. Under this correspondence between denotational and operational notions,
the semantic equation for C expresses that, to evaluate CM in an evaluation context
4 Given two objects or programs satisfying a specication one will certainly prefer the one which
terminates more often.
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represented by k one simply applies (the meaning of) M to ret(k) in the empty
evaluation context represented by the continuation stop. The denotation ret(k) is
used only implicitly in the C-calculus. In the subsequently introduced -calculus,
however, it will appear as the denotation of a term of the extended language
(provided k is denotable by a term). The behaviour of denotation ret(k) can be
explained as follows: when applying the denotation ret(k) to a denotation d w.r.t. a
continuation h then the result is d(k), i.e. the current continuation h is forgotten and
the argument d is evaluated w.r.t. the ‘returned’ continuation k.
These intuitive explanations will get precise when we study equational laws of
C-calculus and Krivine’s machine. But rst, we consider some examples showing
the use and expressivity of the control operator C.
To illustrate the expressivity of Felleisen’s C we briefly show how to dene some
simple (and well-known) C-terms implementing some derived control operators
analogously to those found as primitives in realistic call-by-value functional lan-
guages as SCHEME and NJ-SML. Due to the importance of these call-by-value
languages there is a large amount of syntactically oriented work investigating
Felleisen’s C and its expressivity for a call-by-value version of C-calculus (Felleisen,
1986; Felleisen et al., 1987; Grin, 1990; Felleisen and Hieb, 1992; Sabry and
Felleisen, 1992).
First, we state a lemma which is technically useful for many computations and
explains in which sense C is an inverse to ‘double negation’.
Lemma 3.4
For any term M we have
(1) [[C(f: f M)]] e k = [[M]] e[f := ret(k)] k
(2) [[C(f: f M)]] e k = [[M]] e k if f 62 FV (M) .
Notice that point (2) of Lemma 3.4 says that C can be reformulated as C(M) =
M where  stands for the ‘double negation’ operator x: f: f x. That means that
using C one can ‘unpack’ terms which have been ‘encapsulated’ by the ‘double
negation’ operator .
Below we briefly sketch how other control operators known from the literature
can be expressed in terms of C by giving a syntactic denition and the corresponding
semantic equation.
Abort operator
AM := C(f:M) with f 62 FV (M):
Its semantics can be computed as
[[AM]] e k = [[C(f:M)]] e k = [[M]] e[f := ret(k)] stop = [[M]] e stop
demonstrating that evaluation ofAM in context k amounts to forgetting the current
context and evaluating M in the empty context represented by stop.
Error-handling
handle err in M by N := C(f : f ((err:M)(f N)))
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where f is a fresh variable. The semantics of this construct can be computed as
follows:
[[handle err in M by N]] e k=
= [[C(f: f((err:M)(f N)))]] e k = (Lemma 3.4(1))
= [[(err:M)(f N)]] e[f := ret(k)] k =
= [[M]] e[err := [[f N]] e[f := ret(k)]] k =
= [[M]] e[err := h: [[N]] e k] k
Intuitively, the evaluation of handle err in M by N in context k is as follows: one
evaluates expression M in context k but whenever during that process one has to
evaluate the expression err w.r.t. a (new) context h then this context h is forgotten
and expression N is evaluated instead w.r.t. the old context k. Note that no raise
construct is necessary as opposed to the call-by-value case.
Call with current continuation
call=cc M := C(f : f (M f )) with f 62 FV(M):
This yields the following semantic equation.
[[call=cc M]] e k = [[M]] e hret(k); ki:
Notice that the dierence between call=cc and C is that { although [[M]] e in
both cases is applied to ret(k) { the continuations w.r.t. which the applications are
evaluated are dierent: in case of call=cc the continuation is the current continuation
k whereas in the case of C it is stop representing the empty evaluation context.
Taking A and call=cc as basic control operators together with their dening
semantic equations
[[AM]] e k = [[M]] e stop
[[call=ccM]] e k = [[M]] e hret(k); ki
then one can verify that
[[call=cc(x:A(M x)]] e k = [[M]] e hret(k); stopi
for all terms M with x 62 FV (M). Thus, Felleisen’s C is denable from A and
call=cc.
3.2.2 Some useful laws of C-calculus
In this subsection we will derive some equational laws for the C-calculus. These
laws will turn out as analogous to the ones stated by Felleisen et al. (1987) and
Felleisen and Hieb (1992) for the call-by-value variant of the C-calculus.
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Theorem 3.5
In any continuation model for the C-calculus the following equalities are true for
all terms M, N and evaluation contexts E:
() (x:M)N = M[N=x]
() x: (M x) = M if x 62 FV (M)
(C1) C(f:fM) = M if f 62 FV (M)
(C2) C(f:CM) = C(f:M(x:Ax))
(C3) E[CM] = C(f:M(x: f E[x])) with f 62 FV (M) [ FV (E)
Proof
The Substitution Lemma, i.e. [[M[N=x]]] e = [[M]] e[x := [[N]] e] provided N is free
for x in M, can be proved straightforwardly by induction on the structure of M.
Using this basic fact we can show the validity of the rules () and ().
The equation (C1) follows immediately from Lemma 3.4 (2).
The equation (C2) is valid as
[[C(f:CM)]] e k =
= [[f:CM]] h ret(k); stop i =
= [[CM]] e[f := ret(k)] e stop =
= [[M]] e[f := ret(k)] h ret(stop); stop i
[[C(f:M(x:Ax)]] e k =
= [[f:M(x:Ax)]] e h ret(k); stop i =
= [[M(x:Ax)]] e[f := ret(k)] stop =
= [[M]] e[f := ret(k)] h [[x:Ax)]] e; stop i
and
[[x:Ax)]] e h d; k i =
= [[Ax]] e[x := d] k =
= [[x]] e[x := d] stop = d stop =
= ret(stop) h d; k i .
For proving the equations (C3) assume that E  [] P1 : : : Pn and for a continuation
k 2 C and an environment e let kE;e := h[[P1]] e; : : : ; h[[Pn]] e; ki : : :i.
[[E[CM]]] e k = [[CM]] e kE;e = [[M]] e h ret(kE;e); stop i
and
[[C(f:M(x: f E[x]))]] e k
= [[f:M(x: f E[x])]] e h ret(k); stop i =
= [[M(x: f E[x])]] e[f := ret(k)] stop =
= [[M]] e h [[x: f E[x]]] e[f := ret(k)]; stop i .
It remains to show that ret(kE;e) = [[x: f E[x]]] e[f := ret(k)] :
[[x: f E[x]]] e[f := ret(k)]h d; h i =
= [[f E[x]]] e[f := ret(k)][x := d] h =
= ret(k)h [[E[x]]] e[x := d]; h i =
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= [[E[x]]] e[x := d] k =
= d kE;e[x:=d] = (as x is not free in E)
= d kE;e =
= ret(kE;e)h d; h i
which nishes the proof. q
Remark 3.1
One might be inclined to postulate
E[CM] = M (x: E[x])
as an intuitive explanation of the meaning of C. It is, however, inconsistent as
C(f: x: x) = (f: x: x)(x: x) = x: x and, therefore, for all terms M we have
M = (x: x)M = C(f: x: x)M = (f: x: x) (x: xM) = x: x, i.e. all terms M are
equal to x: x.
3.3 The -Calculus
In this section we will use our continuation semantics for interpreting an untyped
variant of Parigot’s -calculus. The typed -calculus has been introduced by
Parigot (1992) in a purely syntactical way, to give a proof term assignment for
classical logic formulated in natural deduction style. Here we will not further
investigate the logical aspects of the -calculus, but rather demonstrate that it is a
flexible language for expressing general control operators.
The untyped -calculus is an extension of the ordinary -calculus by two new
syntactic categories: continuation expressions and R-terms. The underlying intuition
is that ordinary terms denote elements of D, i.e. denotations, R-terms denote ele-
ments in R, i.e. responses, and continuation expressions denote elements in C , i.e.
continuations. Thus the untyped -calculus allows to refer explicitly to semantic
objects like responses and continuations which in C-calculus can be referred to
only in an indirect way.
First we give the syntax of the untyped -calculus in BNF-form.
Denition 3.4
Let Var and CVar be two disjoint innite sets of (object) variables and continuation
variables, respectively. We will use x; y; z : : : as meta-variables for object variables
and ; ; γ : : : as meta-variables for continuation variables.
(Term) M ::= x j x:M j MM j : t
(Cont) C ::=  j M :: C
(R-Term) t ::= [C]M
The -calculus is an extension of the ordinary -calculus. Therefore, we may
extend our continuation semantics for the -calculus (as given in Theorem 3.2) to
the full -calculus.
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Denition 3.5
Let D = RC where C is the initial/terminal solution of C = RC C . Let Env be the
set of environments, i.e. functions mapping object variables to elements of D and
continuations variables to elements of C . The interpretation functions
[[ ]]D : Term! Env ! D
[[ ]]C : Cont! Env ! C
[[ ]]R : R{Term! Env ! R
are dened by structural recursion as follows :
[[x]]D e = e(x)
[[ x:M]]D e hd; ki = [[M]]D e[x := d] k
[[MN]]D e k = [[M]]D e h[[N]]D e; ki
[[: t]]D e k = [[t]]R e[ := k]
[[]]C e = e()
[[M :: C]]C e = h[[M]]D e; [[C]]C ei
[[[C]M]]R e = [[M]]D e ([[C]]C e)
Convention. We will omit the subscripts of the interpretation functions dened above
as they can be read o from the term between the semantic brackets.
The idea of ‘continuations as objects’ is illustrated by the following example
[[:[]M]] e k = [[M]] e[ := k] e()
swapping continuations.
Notice that Parigot’s original formulation of the -calculus { besides being typed
rather than untyped { does not have continuation terms but only continuation
variables. In our extended syntax the general form of continuation expressions
is M1 :: : : : :: Mn :: , i.e. continuation expressions are stacks of ordinary terms
whose bottom is a continuation variable. Due to this extension, we can express
the substitution [M :: =] directly instead of introducing it as a new primitive
called ‘mixed substitution’ in Parigot (1992). Thus, by admitting these more general
continuation expressions we get a considerable simplication of the equational
presentation of -calculus.
Theorem 3.6
The continuation model for the untyped -calculus validates the following equa-
tional axioms.
() (x:M)N = M[N=x]
() x: (M x) = M where x not free in M
(cont) [C] :t = t[C=]
(cont) : []M = M where  not free in M
(Swap) [C](MN) = [N :: C]M
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Proof
The verications of () and () are as in the proof of Theorem 3.5.
The remaining equations follow from the semantic equations of Denition 3.5
and a Substitution Lemma for continuation variables which says that for arbitrary
expressions A and arbitrary continuation expressions C
[[A[C=]]] e = [[A]] e[ := [[C]] e]
for all e 2 Env.
For (cont) consider
[[[C] :t]] e = [[:t]] e ([[C]] e) = [[t]] e[ := [[C]] e] = [[t[C=]]] e :
For (cont) consider
[[: []M]] e k = [[[]M]] e[ := k] = [[M]] e[ := k] (e[ := k]()) = [[M]] e k :
For (Swap) consider
[[[C](MN)]] e =
[[MN]] e ([[C]] e) = [[M]] e h[[N]] e; [[C]] ei = [[M]] e ([[N :: C]] e) =
[[[N :: C]M]] e .
q
The usual control operators can now be expressed in the -calculus as
C  f: : []f(x: : []x)
call=cc  f : : []f (x: : []x)
A  f: : []f
where  is a distinguished unbound continuation variable whose intended meaning
is the distinguished continuation stop considered previously (for C-calculus).
Notice that the -terms above are almost identical with the semantic equations
for these control operators in our previous continuation semantics for C-calculus.
This demonstrates that -calculus reflects more closely the underlying semantics
than C-calculus.
We now discuss the equation (Swap) and explain why it is crucial for simplifying
the previous axiomatisations given in Parigot (1992) and Ong and Ritter (1994). The
rule (Swap) does not appear in loc.cit. as its right hand side is not even part of his
syntax. Using the rule (Swap) we can derive in our extended calculus the equation
(:t)M = : []((: t)M) = : [M :: ](: t) = : (t[M :: =])
employing ordinary substitution of continuation expressions for continuation vari-
ables. This was impossible in Parigot’s original calculus where continuation variables
were the only form of continuation expressions. Using the equation above we can
derive the so-called ()-rule
:t = x:(:t)x = x::t[x :: =]
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which plays an essential role in Ong’s treatment of -calculus (Ong and Ritter,
1994; Hofmann and Streicher, 1997).
When trying to use the equations of Theorem 3.6 in order to obtain a deterministic
rewrite strategy for -calculus it is not clear how to orient the equation (Swap) due
to its apparent symmetry.
But for giving a rewrite semantics to -calculus by cont it suces to give
reduction rules for R-terms, i.e. expressions of the form [C]M. In order to have a
deterministic evaluation strategy the rule used to rewrite an R-term [C]M should
depend only upon the shape of M.
If M M1M2 then by applying (Swap) in the direction left-to-right [C]M reduces
to [M2 :: C]M1.
If M  : t then by applying (cont) in the direction left-to-right [C]M reduces
to t[C=].
Using the equation (Swap) in the direction right-to-left we get
[N :: C](x:M) = [C]((x:M)N) = [C](M[N=x])
which { when read from left to right { tells us what to do in case of functional
abstractions.
Summarizing, we have the following three rewrite rules allowing one to reduce
R-terms :
[C](MN)! [N :: C]M
[N :: C](x:M)! [C](M[N=x])
[C](:t)! t[C=]:
The rst two rules correspond to the transition rules of Krivine’s machine for
pure -calculus, which will be introduced in the next section. The third rule provides
a transition rule suitable for an extension of Krivine’s machine to -calculus.
Though the rewrite system above contains the key ideas of Krivine’s machine,
it is still dierent from it in the respect that the formulation of the rules employs
substitution as a basic operation, e.g. the second rule is essentially the -rule of
ordinary -calculus. The pragmatic superiority of Krivine’s machine is that it avoids
substitution as a basic operation (which might be quite costy as the size of terms may
explode) and, instead of terms, manipulates so-called closures, i.e. terms together
with an environment. Substitution will only be performed when actually needed, i.e.
when applied to a term that is already a variable. This will be achieved by a further
transition rule of Krivine’s machine.
4 From continuation semantics to abstract machines
The aim of this section is to give a rational reconstruction of the operational
semantics of -calculi with control features by deriving abstract machines from their
continuation semantics.
Usually, these machines compute only weak head normal forms. It is straight-
forward to extend them to machines computing head normal forms and for these
we can prove computational adequacy w.r.t. our continuation semantics.
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4.1 The C-calculus
In this section we will derive an abstract machine for C-calculus based on its
continuation semantics as introduced in section 3.2 by turning the semantic equations
into transition rules. Our abstract machine for C-calculus will be an extension of
Krivine’s machine for pure untyped -calculus (Abadi et al., 1991).
4.1.1 Krivine’s machine
Any semantic equation of Denition 3.3 is of the form
[[M]] e k = [[M 0]] e0 k0
where M;M 0 are terms, e; e0 are environments and k; k0 are continuations. Expressions
of the form [[M]] e denote elements of D and can be considered simply as pairs of
terms and environments, traditionally called closures. In the presence of control
operator C, closures may also be of the form ret(k) where k is a continuation.
Continuation expressions are of the form stop or h c; k i, where c is a closure and
k is a continuation expression. Thus continuation expressions are simply stacks of
closures (with stop as empty stack).
This suggests to dene a machine whose states are pairs whose rst component is a
closure and whose second component is a stack of closures. As already noted above,
a closure is a pair of a term and an environment binding nitely many variables
to closures. The rewrite rules of the machine operating on states will mimic the
semantic equations of Denition 3.3. We will relate the machine arising this way to
the continuation semantics by dening interpretation functions mapping closures to
elements of D, stacks to elements of C , environments to functions from Var to D and
states to elements of .
We rst give a denition of Krivine’s machine.
Denition 4.1
If A and B are sets then A!n B denotes the set of nite partial functions from A
to B. For any e 2 A !n B we write dom(e) for the nite subset of A where e is
dened.
The sets Term of terms, Env of environments, Clos of closures, Stack of stacks
(of closures) and State of machine states are dened inductively as follows:
(Term) M ::= x j x:M j MM j CM
(Env) env 2 Var!n Clos
(Clos) c ::= [M; env ] j ret(S)
(Stack) S ::= stop j h c; S i
(State)  ::= h c; S i
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The binary transition relation ! on State is given by the following transition rules:
(Var) h [x; env ]; S i ! h env (x); S i if x 2 dom(env )
(Fun) h [x:M; env ]; h c; S i i ! h [M; env [x := c]]; S i
(App) h [MN; env]; S i ! h [M; env ]; h [N; env ]; S i i
(C) h [CM; env ]; S i ! h [M; env]; h ret(S); stop i i
(Ret) h ret(S); h c; S 0 i i ! h c; S i
We write trans for the partial function whose graph is !. Notice that ! is
deterministic, i.e. if  ! 1 and  ! 2 then 1 and 2 are equal. Let Eval be the
partial function associating with any state  the state transn() where transn+1() is
undened and transi() is dened for all i 6 n. If transn() is dened for all n then
Eval() is undened. A state  is nal i trans() is undened. Obviously, a state 
is nal i it is of one of the following forms:
(i) h [x; env ]; S i with x 62 dom(env )
(ii) h [x:M; env ]; stop i
(iii) h ret(S); stop i
Thus, nal states are either a head variable followed by a list of closures (case (i))
or the stack is empty and the rst component is a function denition either of the
form [ x:M; env ] (case (ii)) or of the form ret(S) (case (iii)).
Next we dene the denotational semantics of Krivine’s Machine (KM).
Denition 4.2
The interpretation functions
[[ ]]State : State! 
[[ ]]Clos : Clos! D
[[ ]]Env : Env! Var! D
[[ ]]Stack : Stack! C
are given by the following semantic equations
[[h c; S i]]State = [[c]]Clos([[S]]Stack)
[[h c; S i]]Stack = h[[c]]Clos; [[S]]Stacki
[[stop]]Stack = >C := h>D; [[stop]]Stacki
[[env ]]Env(x) = if x 2 dom(env ) then [[env (x)]]Clos else >D
[[[M; env ]]]Clos = [[M]] [[env ]]Env
[[ret(S)]]Clos hd; ki = d [[S]]Stack
where >D = k:> (recall that R = ) and for a term M its semantics [[M]] is dened
as in Denition 3.3.
The next theorem states the correctness of Krivine’s machine.
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Theorem 4.1
(1) For all terms M it holds that
[[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = [[M]] e> >C
where  is the empty environment and e>(x) = >D for all variables x.
(2) The relation ! preserves semantics of states, i.e. for all states ; 0 it holds
that
 ! 0 implies [[]]State = [[0]]State:
Proof
(1) follows immediately from the semantic equations of Denition 4.2. (2) is proved
by straightforward case analysis on  ! 0 employing the semantic equations of
Denition 3.3 and Denition 4.2. q
This is a rather minimal form of correctness stating only that the transitions of the
machine preserve the semantics of states. Nevertheless, it might happen for a term
M that Eval(h [M; ]; stop i) is undened, i.e. the machine started with initial state
h [M; ]; stop i never halts, although [[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = >, i.e. ‘semantically’ it
should terminate.
Actually, one would like that
[[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = > i Eval(h [M; ]; stop i) is dened
i.e. that the machine started with initial state h [M; ]; stop i eventually halts if and
only if it halts ‘semantically’, i.e. [[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = >. Such an equivalence
is commonly called computational adequacy because it says that operational and
semantical notions of termination are equivalent, i.e. the denotational semantics is
adequate w.r.t. the operational behaviour.
The implication from left to right will be proved in section 4.1.2 in Theorem 4.4(ii).
But the reverse direction cannot be true in general for the following reason. The term
Ω  (x: x x) (x: x x) does not have a head normal form and therefore x:Ω does not
have a head normal form either. Therefore, by Theorem 3.3 [[h [x:Ω; ]; stop i]]State =
? though h [x:Ω; ]; stop i is already a nal state and thus Eval(h [x:Ω; ]; stop i)
is dened.
The reason for this ‘failure’ is that Krivine’s machine does not compute head
normal forms but weak head normal forms.
Theorem 4.2
A term M has a weak head normal form i Eval(h [M; ]; stop i) is dened where 
is the empty environment.
Proof
For a precise proof one has to introduce a -calculus with explicit substitution as
done in detail in Abadi et al. (1991) and Curien (1991). Here we only give an intuitive
relation between reduction steps in Krivine’s machine and steps of the weak head
reduction.
The reduction steps (Fun), (Ret) of Krivine’s machine correspond to -reduction
steps in the process of weak head reduction. Reduction step (C) of Krivine’s
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machine corresponds to step (C) in the process of weak head reduction, where
ret(S) corresponds to x:C(f: E[x]) and S is the stack corresponding to evaluation
context E. The rule (App) of Krivine’s machine allows to store the current evaluation
context on the stack. The rule (Var) handles substitution. It has to be noted that
substitution is actually performed only when applied to a variable. The rule (App)
distributes substitution over the components of an application term. A substitution
applied to a -abstraction is never performed as we are only interested in (weak)
head normal forms. q
4.1.2 Extended Krivine’s machine and its computational adequacy
Now we dene an extension of Krivine’s machine computing head normal forms
instead of only weak head normal forms. For this Extended Krivine’s machine we
prove a computational adequacy theorem which says that for every term M there is a
terminating sequence of transitions, starting starting from initial state h [M; ]; stop i
i the denotation of this initial state equals >.
Denition 4.3
Let !h be the binary transition relation on State containing the relation ! of
Denition 4.1 augmented by the rules
(Fun-h) h [x:M; env ]; stop i !h h [M[y=x]; env ]; stop i
(Ret-h) h ret(S); stop i !h h [y; ]; S i
where in both cases y is a fresh variable (which in case of (Fun-h) in particular
means that y 62 dom(env )).
The resulting extension of Krivine’s machine will be called the Extended Krivine’s
machine.
Let trans-h and Eval-h be dened analogously to Denition 4.1. A state  is
h-nal i trans-h() is undened. Obviously, a state  is h-nal i it is of the form
h [x; env ]; S i with x 2 Var and x 62 dom(env ).
Remark 4.1
The Extended Krivine’s machine with !h as transition relation is a modication
which allows us to compute head normal forms, and not only weak head normal
forms, since whenever computation reaches a state of the form h [x:M; env ]; stop i
or of the form h ret(S); stop i { both corresponding to a functional abstraction {
then one introduces a fresh variable for the bound variable and proceeds with the
computation.
The introduction of the fresh variable may be considered as a ‘side eect’ of a
transition of the form (Fun-h) or (Ret-h). One could keep track of these side-eects
by adding a further component to the state, namely a list of variables where in steps
(Fun-h) and (Ret-h) the new fresh variable y is added to the list of variables, and
in all other steps the list remains unchanged. Thus, when computation has nished
one has a list of fresh variables corresponding to the -prex of the head normal
form, together with a head variable which can be read o from the nal state, and
a list of closures corresponding to the list of arguments for the head variable. To
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compute normal forms by leftmost-outermost strategy, one could now apply the
machine recursively to each of these closures in parallel.
We now prove the computational adequacy of the Extended Krivine’s Machine.
Theorem 4.3
For all  2 State it holds that [[]]State = > i  2 dom(Eval-h), i.e. Extended
Krivine’s Machine stops when started with initial state .
Proof
First notice that there exist relations { so-called inclusive predicates {
RState   State
RStack  C  Stack
RClos  D  Clos
REnv  (Var! D) Env
RTerm  ((Var! D)! D) Term
satisfying the requirements:
uRState  , u = > implies  2 dom(Eval-h)
k RStack stop always valid
hd; kiRStack hc; Si , dRClos c and k RStack S
dRClos c , 8k RStack S: d(k)RState hc; Si
e REnv env , 8x 2 dom(env ): e(x)RClos env (x)
f RTerm M , 8e REnv env : f(e)RClos [M; env]:
An elegant general method for the construction of such inclusive predicates for
the initial/terminal solution of an arbitrary domain equation and its associated
language has been given by Pitts (1994), to which we refer for a proof. We do not
repeat Pitt’s argument here as for the purposes of our proof; we only need the mere
existence of the required inclusive predicates.
But now, from the existence of the inclusive predicates and the required equiv-
alences for them one shows by straightforward (simultaneous) structural induction
that
[[]]State RState  for all  2 State
[[S]]Stack RStack S for all S 2 Stack
[[c]]Clos RClos c for all c 2 Clos
[[env ]]Env REnv env for all env 2 Env
[[M]]RTerm M for all terms M :
Thus, for all  2 State we have [[]]State RState , i.e.  2 dom(Eval-h) if [[]]State = >,
which proves the implication from left to right.
The implication from right to left follows from the facts that the transition relation
!h preserves denotations of states and that the denotation of nal states is > (as
if h [x; env ]; S i is a nal state then x =2 dom(env ) and, therefore, [[env ]]Env(x) = >).
q
As a consequence, we get the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.4
Let  be the empty environment. Then for any term M
(i) [[M]] e> 6= ?D , h [M; ]; stop i 2 dom(Eval-h)
(ii) [[M]] e> 6= ?D ) h [M; ]; stop i 2 dom(Eval).
Proof
First notice that, by Theorem 4.1 (1), we have [[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = [[M]] e> >C
and therefore [[M]] e> 6= ?D i [[M]] e> >C = > i [[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = >. Now
by instantiating  = h [M; ]; stop i claim (i) follows immediately from Theorem 4.3.
Claim (ii) follows from (i) by the fact that dom(Eval-h) is contained in dom(Eval)
as ! is a subrelation of !h. q
The reverse implication of (ii) in the above theorem does not hold as the
containment of dom(Eval-h) in dom(Eval) is proper even for states of the form
h [M; ]; stop i (e.g. when M has a weak head normal form but not a head normal
form as is the case for M = x:Ω).
4.2 The -calculus
In this section we derive an abstract machine for -calculus based on its contin-
uation semantics as introduced in section 3.3. As for C-calculus the method of
derivation again will be to consider the semantic equations as transition rules of the
abstract machine.
Our abstract machine for -calculus will be an extension of Krivine’s machine
for the untyped -calculus without control operators. It will turn out that the
distinguishing feature of -calculus is that there are continuation variables which
can be assigned continuations by environments. Thus, we have an extended notion
of environment which assign denotations to object variables and continuations to
continuation variables. We write Var for the set of object variables and CVar for the
set of continuation variables.
We will not employ our extended syntax of section 3.3, but stick to Parigot’s
original language. The reason for this is that the extended language is only needed
for formulating the rule (Swap) simplifying equational reasoning in -calculus.
Therefore, the only term formation rule besides those for pure untyped -calculus is
the following: : []M is a term if M is a term and ,  are continuation variables.
4.2.1 Krivine’s machine for -calculus
Before giving the precise denition, we informally describe the components of Kriv-
ine’s machine for -calculus. Note that a similar machine has been found indepen-
dently by de Groote (1996), albeit by purely syntactical methods which seem, however,
to be more complicated than our semantic approach, in the authors’ opinion.
States will be pairs h c; S i where c is a closure and S is a stack representing a
continuation.
Due to the absence of C and ret, closures will now simply be pairs [M; env ]
where M is a term and env is an environment.
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An environment env will actually be a pair henvob; env conti where envob is a nite
partial map sending object variables to closures and env cont is a nite partial map
sending continuation variables to stacks. For x 2 Var and  2 CVar we systematically
write env (x) and env () for envob(x) and env cont(), respectively. Accordingly, we
write dom(env ) for the (nite) set of object and continuation variables on which env
is dened.
Continuations representing stacks are expressions of the form hc1; : : : hcn; i : : :i, i.e.
stacks of closures built on top of ‘empty stacks’ represented by unbound continuation
variables.
Denition 4.4
The sets Term of terms, Env of environments, Clos of closures, Stack of stacks (of
closures) and State of machine states are dened inductively as follows
(Term) M ::= x j x:M j MM j : []M
(Env) env 2 (Var!n Clos) (CVar!n Stack)
(Clos) c ::= [M; env ]
(Stack) S ::=  j h c; S i
(State)  ::= h c; S i
The binary transition relation ! on State is given by the following transition
rules
(Var) h [x; env ]; S i ! h env (x); S i if x 2 dom(env )
(Fun) h [x:M; env]; h c; S i i ! h [M; env [x := c]]; S i
(App) h [MN; env ]; S i ! h [M; env ]; h [N; env ]; S i i
() h [: []M; env ]; S i ! h [M; env [ := S]]; env [ := S]() i
where the last rule () applies if and only if  2 dom(env [ := S]), i.e.  2 dom(env )
or   .
The machine given by the above transition rules is called Krivine’s machine for
-calculus.
Again we write trans and Eval for the partial transition function and the partial
evaluation map, respectively, which are dened as usual.
A state  is nal i trans() is undened, i.e. i  is of one of the following forms
(i) h [x; env ]; S i with x 62 dom(env )
(ii) h [x:M; env];  i for some  2 CVar
(iii) h [: []M; env ]; S i with  62 dom(env ) and  6 .
To make the relation to continuation semantics precise we extend it to Krivine’s
machine for -calculus.
Denition 4.5
The interpretation functions
[[ ]]State : State! 
[[ ]]Clos : Clos! D
[[ ]]Env : Env! Var! D
[[ ]]Stack : Stack! C
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are dened by the following semantic equations
[[h c; S i]]State = [[c]]Clos([[S]]Stack)
[[h c; S i]]Stack = h[[c]]Clos; [[S]]Stacki
[[]]Stack = >C := h>D;>Ci
[[env ]]Env(x) = if x 2 dom(env ) then [[env (x)]]Clos else >D
[[env ]]Env() = if  2 dom(env ) then [[env ()]]Stack else >C
[[[M; env ]]]Clos = [[M]] [[env ]]Env
where >D = k:> (recall that R = ) and for a term M its semantics [[M]] is dened
as in Denition 3.5.
Again we have that Krivine’s machine for the -calculus is correct w.r.t. its
continuation semantics.
Theorem 4.5
(1) For all terms M it holds that
[[h [M; ]; stop i]]State = [[M]] e> >C
where  is the empty environment and e>(x) = >D for all x 2 Var and
e>() = >C for all  2 CVar.
(2) If  ! 0 then [[]]State = [[0]]State.
Proof
(1) follows immediately from the semantic equations of Denition 4.5. (2) is proved
by straightforward case analysis on the transition rules employing the semantic
equations of Denition 3.5 and Denition 4.5. q
4.2.2 Extended Krivine’s machine for -calculus and its computational adequacy
Again, to obtain computational adequacy, we have to extend Krivine’s machine for
-calculus in a way that it reduces under - and -abstractions.
Denition 4.6
Let !h be the binary transition relation on State containing the relation ! of
Denition 4.4 augmented by the rules
(Fun-h) h [x:M; env ];  i !h h [M[y=x]; env ];  i with y fresh
(-h) h [: []M; env ]; S i !h h [M; env [ := S]];  i if  62 dom(env [ := S])
The resulting extension of Krivine’s machine for -calculus will be called Ex-
tended Krivine’s machine for -calculus.
Again, we write trans-h and Eval-h for the transition and evaluation functions,
respectively. A state  is h-nal i trans-h() is undened. Obviously, a state  is
h-nal i it is of the form h [x; env ]; S i with x 2 Var and x 62 dom(env ).
We have computational adequacy of the Extended Krivine’s Machine for -
calculus with respect to its continuation semantics.
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Theorem 4.6
For all  2 State it holds that [[]]State = > i  2 dom(Eval-h), i.e. Extended
Krivine’s Machine for -calculus stops when started with initial state .
Proof
The proof is almost identical with the proof of Theorem 4.3. The only dierence is
that now
REnv  Env  Env
RTerm  (Env ! D) Term
with
e REnv env , 8x 2 dom(env ) \ Var: e(x)RClos env (x) and
8 2 dom(env ) \ CVar: e()RStack env ()
f RTerm M , 8e REnv env : f(e)RClos [M; env]
as new condition for REnv. q
5 Conclusion
We have shown how continuation semantics arising from a simple semantics of
classical logic allows one to explain the meaning of control features in call-by-
name functional languages, and how one can read o an abstract machine from
a continuation semantics. This has been exemplied for -calculus with Felleisen’s
control operator C and Parigot’s -calculus.
Moreover, employing Pitts’ method for cooking up proofs of computational ade-
quacy, we have established that our abstract machines compute head normal forms
of terms whose denotation is dierent from ?.
An analogous treatment is possible for call-by-value languages, but in this case
one has to employ the opposite ofNR which is isomorphic to the Kleisli category for
the continuation monad RR
( )
. It would be nice if one could relate this duality on the
level of semantics to a duality on the syntactical level. This might provide a deeper
understanding of the relation between call-by-name and call-by-value languages.
Another strand of research is to extend the paradigm of deriving abstract machines
from continuation semantics to more realistic languages with basic data types as
booleans, integers, etc., and recursive types. For this purpose it might be appropriate
to give a semantic reformulation of Andrew Appel’s work on ‘compiling with
continuations’ (Appel, 1992) by employing and extending the methods we have
introduced in this paper.
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